|
From the video obvious that is it just a marketing tool rather than a productivity tool.
I wonder how often it fails. And what the service time line is.
Not to mention what it is going to take to successfully (unbroken) deliver that to a convention and get it set up (some places require that their employees set up tech.)
|
|
|
|
|
Hi All,
I may have missed the previous posts but, what the ? I'm a UK resident (with a friend who worked on the system as a contractor) A system that hadn't been tested (it looks like bit were but not as whole) went wrong (where has this happened before?) and some people who obviously had bonuses tied into the launch pushed it through
and bang, splat a 'unforeseen system bug' (are not all bugs unforeseen?) leads to a mismatch in accounts and well people who had over thirty years of service are to blame and not the new system? If you are not aware of this scandal (it might be very UK biased) I would advise you check it out, there is or was something on the Independents web site that explained it quite well Heres a link to the BBC on the matterhttps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56718036
|
|
|
|
|
Yeesh!
The higher ups really had a case of cranial-rectal insertion didn't they?
I’ve given up trying to be calm. However, I am open to feeling slightly less agitated.
I’m begging you for the benefit of everyone, don’t be STUPID.
|
|
|
|
|
MarkTJohnson wrote: cranial-rectal insertion
Nice one, but I prefer recto-cranial inversion.
Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.
-- 6079 Smith W.
|
|
|
|
|
That's what I was trying to remember.
I’ve given up trying to be calm. However, I am open to feeling slightly less agitated.
I’m begging you for the benefit of everyone, don’t be STUPID.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The issue came to light quite some time ago. A local Postmistress got 15 months in jail, even though she was pregnant at the time. An absolute disgrace, and all the numpties at the top laugh their way to the bank, and their next lucrative jobs.
|
|
|
|
|
Private Eye have been reporting this since about 2011 I think, certainly a long time. Suddenly it's all blown up, due in no small part to the docudrama "Mr. Bates vs The Post Office" and everyone is suddenly very agitated as if it's only come to light.
This was going on through three changes of government (Lab, Con-Lib, Con) the P.O. and Fujitsu repeatedly lied about the issues. Suddenly it's the most important home issue for the government (this being an election year may have some bearing) and at last the surviving postmasters and mistresses are to be pardoned and compensated.
It's a national disgrace.
|
|
|
|
|
A minor quibble, but I think it's important:
Alister Morton wrote: the surviving postmasters and mistresses are to be pardoned
They are to be aquitted and exonerated. "Pardoned" suggests that they were guilty but are being "let off". I'm sure you didn't mean to imply that. They were and are, in almost every case, completely innocent.
Phil
The opinions expressed in this post are not necessarily those of the author, especially if you find them impolite, inaccurate or inflammatory.
|
|
|
|
|
Thank for the explanation, I learned something new.
M.D.V.
If something has a solution... Why do we have to worry about?. If it has no solution... For what reason do we have to worry about?
Help me to understand what I'm saying, and I'll explain it better to you
Rating helpful answers is nice, but saying thanks can be even nicer.
|
|
|
|
|
Yes, you're right, exonerated rather than pardoned.
|
|
|
|
|
It's exonerated, their criminal records will then be expunged, hopefully the software for this works. The issue is that Parliament are bypassing the court system to do this and this sets an awful precedent. The political independence of the courts are bypassed, could Parliament decree a person's guilt at some future date? Perhaps a member of the judiciary could be used to oversee the exoneration process.
Also, some numpty has said that one or two might actually be guilty. Now there will be the possibility of the innocent being tainted with suspicion anyway.
|
|
|
|
|
So, what's the tl;dr version?
[Edit]
Nvm...the article is short enough to provide a good overview.
The fact that there was a cover-up is the mind-blowing part. WTF indeed.
modified 12-Jan-24 9:41am.
|
|
|
|
|
My theory is test everything even those bits that 'don't need testing, they work' In a previous role where I was testing motorway road signs I tested every combination and found some issues that could not be fixed as they would break something else. Why do people skimp on testing?
|
|
|
|
|
Do you think the post office read the EULA from Fujitsu and thought “yeah, that’s ok”? You know, the bit in the EULA that all software has: no warranties are expressed or implied…
|
|
|
|
|
The fact that's always amazed me is that the Post Office management worked on the assumption that the computer system (Horizon) was always correct.
I've worked in IT for about 40 years and currently support a legacy system which is slowly being replaced (and which I've written large parts of in the past). At the last estimate, it has a few million lines of code (C#, SQL, Javascript, etc), which some may not consider that large, but is large enough that few people could understand everything it does. It handles several tens of thousands of stock movements and financial transactions every day with the value running into billions annually; there are quite a few single transactions which are worth hundreds of thousands of pounds.
If I get a report that there's an imbalance, my first thought is to check the transaction logs, code etc, and try to determine if there's a bug or a data error which might cause the issue. I do NOT assume the user is at fault except as a last resort.
I find it hard to believe that the Horizon system was taken to be infallible and that people were convicted almost entirely on the basis that it had to be correct, while there was apparently little or no attempt to trace the 'supposed' stolen funds. If they'd taken the money, surely there'd be evidence of where it had gone?
And the fact there there were hundreds of such cases, but no-one thought it odd that so many people who'd been loyal postmasters for decades suddenly had imbalances in their accounts after a new computer system was introduced, and no-one publicly considered that the system might be wrong beggars belief!
Perhaps it's because I have worked in IT so long that I am always suspicious of the computer system first and the user second. Maybe the common man (or senior post office manager?) thinks "it's a machine exactly following its instructions so it must be right" while, as an IT person, I think "what instruction has someone given the machine now which makes it report the wrong information?".
|
|
|
|
|
It's only when you have seen a problem and had to workout what went wrong do you understand how a computer can be wrong. Computers are always right (sort of), As you say between a 'new' wizzy system and Employee of 30 years, I think all CP and any others who have worked on IT for an ammount of time would look first at the system and then at the employee (does there house have a swimming pool are they driving a Tesla?) and look at the system again.
I can't understand why there was no one with that mind set involved...
|
|
|
|
|
Exactly this. What I also find surprising is that out of the hundreds of accused, some of which were very small post offices, not one sub-postmaster had kept a separate record of transactions for manual reconciliation - even right after the introduction of Horizon. Given that sub-postmasters are indeed responsible for their accounts, I'm amazed that no-one had kept such an audit (effectively carrying on the previous manual record keeping that Horizon replaced) - which, whilst not proof that fraud was not involved, would have at least provided evidence to any investigation.
This issue has been rumbling on for so many years; I think I recall reading about the root cause quite some years ago, and periodically individual cases have been reported in the press - even national television - for ages. It's telling, and very sad, that it takes a "drama" on TV to finally get it into the general consciousness and give it the attention it's always deserved. Even then the issue has focussed on "remote access" and manual adjustments, rather than the actual bugs that caused the need for adjustments anyway.
The last major system I built from scratch, the VERY FIRST thing I did was build a logging system so that everything could be tracked and debugged. On the database, for every table, before writing insert/load/update stored procedures, I wrote a couple of triggers per table that logged each and every data change (whether made by the application or by any other means). If these steps had been taken at Fujitsu, it might not have made detecting bugs easier, but would have provided evidence to assist in debugging and in identifying the source of changes to data. But as the Guardian reported last week: One member of the development team, David McDonnell, who had worked on the Epos system side of the project, told the inquiry that “of eight [people] in the development team, two were very good, another two were mediocre but we could work with them, and then there were probably three or four who just weren’t up to it and weren’t capable of producing professional code”.
|
|
|
|
|
Humans are imperfect and messy.
Software fails.
But so do bridges and buildings. Even waste dumps.
So do big and small businesses.
So do government officials, armies, police forces, intelligent agencies, etc. Even entire countries.
The reasons are very seldom simple. Corruption, ignorance, mismanagement, sickness and others play a role.
Hindsight is great but it doesn't translate into foresight.
It isn't a matter of having no failures. Best one can hope for is that at least they will try to do better at least for a short time.
|
|
|
|
|
Exactly. That's why we as developers need to instrument our systems so that they are traceable and debuggable, track changes and so on.
The issue with the Post Office was that their management, (and / or Fujitsu's) refused to acknowledge that their software was fallible, and therefore - even if it existed - failed to use the diagnostics to find out what had gone wrong. The only "culprit" left, therefore, were the users - the sub-postmasters. To what extent that refusal to accept that Horizon might have bugs was down to naivety, ignorance or stupidity, and to what extent it was deliberate, will hopefully come to light in the not-too-distant future.
|
|
|
|
|
DerekT-P wrote: refused to acknowledge that their software was fallible,
Very, very rare in my experience that organizations admit to failure.
Individual humans are more likely to admit to failure but are very resistant to it even so.
The likelihood of either goes down as complexity goes up.
|
|
|
|
|
Thankfully, yes very rare. That's part of what makes this scandal so shocking.
|
|
|
|
|
Even if they had kept manual records, I suspect the Post Office staff sent round to interview them would have ignored any evidence, or used it to imply the manual records were to cover up the fraud.
These interviewers were bullies, using scare tactics beyond anything our esteemed police forces would use.
|
|
|
|
|
Perhaps I have viewed too many movies and TV series legal dramas but it seems to me the defense attorneys should have investigated the Horizon code.
|
|
|
|
|
Solicitors and barristers (== the UK types of lawyers) know no more about computers than software people know about the practice of law. Also, if the postmasters were honest, they certainly didn't have the kind of money required to hire top tier legal defence, including investigators, computer experts, etc.
Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.
-- 6079 Smith W.
|
|
|
|
|